Writings of Augustine. The City of God.
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The City of God.
translated by Rev. Marcus Dods, D.D.
Published in 1886 by Philip Schaff,
New York: Christian Literature Publishing Co.
.
Book VIII.
Argument--Augustin comes now to the third kind of theology, that is,
the natural, and takes up the question, whether the worship of the
gods of the natural theology is of any avail towards securing
blessedness in the life to come. This question he prefers to discuss
with the Platonists, because the Platonic system is "facile princeps"
among philosophies, and makes the nearest approximation to Christian
truth. In pursuing this argument, he first refutes Apuleius, and all
who maintain that the demons should be worshipped as messengers and
mediators between gods and men; demonstrating that by no possibility
can men be reconciled to good gods by demons, who are the slaves of
vice, and who delight in and patronize what good and wise men abhor
and condemn,--The blasphemous fictions of poets, theatrical
exhibitions, and magical arts.
Chapter 1.--That the Question of Natural Theology is to Be Discussed
with Those Philosophers Who Sought a More Excellent Wisdom.
We shall require to apply our mind with far greater intensity to the
present question than was requisite in the solution and unfolding of
the questions handled in the preceding books; for it is not with
ordinary men, but with philosophers that we must confer concerning the
theology which they call natural. For it is not like the fabulous,
that is, the theatrical; nor the civil, that is, the urban theology:
the one of which displays the crimes of the gods, whilst the other
manifests their criminal desires, which demonstrate them to be rather
malign demons than gods. It is, we say, with philosophers we have to
confer with respect to this theology,--men whose very name, if
rendered into Latin, signifies those who profess the love of wisdom.
Now, if wisdom is God, who made all things, as is attested by the
divine authority and truth, [296] then the philosopher is a lover of
God. But since the thing itself, which is called by this name, exists
not in all who glory in the name,--for it does not follow, of course,
that all who are called philosophers are lovers of true wisdom,--we
must needs select from the number of those with whose opinions we have
been able to acquaint ourselves by reading, some with whom we may not
unworthily engage in the treatment of this question. For I have not
in this work undertaken to refute all the vain opinions of the
philosophers, but only such as pertain to theology, which Greek word
we understand to mean an account or explanation of the divine nature.
Nor, again, have I undertaken to refute all the vain theological
opinions of all the philosophers, but only of such of them as,
agreeing in the belief that there is a divine nature, and that this
divine nature is concerned about human affairs, do nevertheless deny
that the worship of the one unchangeable God is sufficient for the
obtaining of a blessed life after death, as well as at the present
time; and hold that, in order to obtain that life, many gods, created,
indeed, and appointed to their several spheres by that one God, are to
be worshipped. These approach nearer to the truth than even Varro;
for, whilst he saw no difficulty in extending natural theology in its
entirety even to the world and the soul of the world, these
acknowledge God as existing above all that is of the nature of soul,
and as the Creator not only of this visible world, which is often
called heaven and earth, but also of every soul whatsoever, and as Him
who gives blessedness to the rational soul,--of which kind is the
human soul,--by participation in His own unchangeable and incorporeal
light. There is no one, who has even a slender knowledge of these
things, who does not know of the Platonic philosophers, who derive
their name from their master Plato. Concerning this Plato, then, I
will briefly state such things as I deem necessary to the present
question, mentioning beforehand those who preceded him in time in the
same department of literature.
Footnotes
[296] Wisdom vii. 24-27.
Chapter 2.--Concerning the Two Schools of Philosophers, that Is, the
Italic and Ionic, and Their Founders.
As far as concerns the literature of the Greeks, whose language holds
a more illustrious place than any of the languages of the other
nations, history mentions two schools of philosophers, the one called
the Italic school, originating in that part of Italy which was
formerly called Magna Græcia; the other called the Ionic school,
having its origin in those regions which are still called by the name
of Greece. The Italic school had for its founder Pythagoras of Samos,
to whom also the term "philosophy" is said to owe its origin. For
whereas formerly those who seemed to excel others by the laudable
manner in which they regulated their lives were called sages,
Pythagoras, on being asked what he professed, replied that he was a
philosopher, that is, a student or lover of wisdom; for it seemed to
him to be the height of arrogance to profess oneself a sage. [297]
The founder of the Ionic school, again, was Thales of Miletus, one of
those seven who were styled the "seven sages," of whom six were
distinguished by the kind of life they lived, and by certain maxims
which they gave forth for the proper conduct of life. Thales was
distinguished as an investigator into the nature of things; and, in
order that he might have successors in his school, he committed his
dissertations to writing. That, however, which especially rendered
him eminent was his ability, by means of astronomical calculations,
even to predict eclipses of the sun and moon. He thought, however,
that water was the first principle of things, and that of it all the
elements of the world, the world itself, and all things which are
generated in it, ultimately consist. Over all this work, however,
which, when we consider the world, appears so admirable, he set
nothing of the nature of divine mind. To him succeeded Anaximander,
his pupil, who held a different opinion concerning the nature of
things; for he did not hold that all things spring from one principle,
as Thales did, who held that principle to be water, but thought that
each thing springs from its own proper principle. These principles of
things he believed to be infinite in number, and thought that they
generated innumerable worlds, and all the things which arise in them.
He thought, also, that these worlds are subject to a perpetual process
of alternate dissolution and regeneration, each one continuing for a
longer or shorter period of time, according to the nature of the case;
nor did he, any more than Thales, attribute anything to a divine mind
in the production of all this activity of things. Anaximander left as
his successor his disciple Anaximenes, who attributed all the causes
of things to an infinite air. He neither denied nor ignored the
existence of gods, but, so far from believing that the air was made by
them, he held, on the contrary, that they sprang from the air.
Anaxagoras, however, who was his pupil, perceived that a divine mind
was the productive cause of all things which we see, and said that all
the various kinds of things, according to their several modes and
species, were produced out of an infinite matter consisting of
homogeneous particles, but by the efficiency of a divine mind.
Diogenes, also, another pupil of Anaximenes, said that a certain air
was the original substance of things out of which all things were
produced, but that it was possessed of a divine reason, without which
nothing could be produced from it. Anaxagoras was succeeded by his
disciple Archelaus, who also thought that all things consisted of
homogeneous particles, of which each particular thing was made, but
that those particles were pervaded by a divine mind, which perpetually
energized all the eternal bodies, namely, those particles, so that
they are alternately united and separated. Socrates, the master of
Plato, is said to have been the disciple of Archelaus; and on Plato's
account it is that I have given this brief historical sketch of the
whole history of these schools.
Footnotes
[297] Sapiens,that is, a wise man, one who had attained to wisdom.
Chapter 3.--Of the Socratic Philosophy.
Socrates is said to have been the first who directed the entire effort
of philosophy to the correction and regulation of manners, all who
went before him having expended their greatest efforts in the
investigation of physical, that is, natural phenomena. However, it
seems to me that it cannot be certainly discovered whether Socrates
did this because he was wearied of obscure and uncertain things, and
so wished to direct his mind to the discovery of something manifest
and certain, which was necessary in order to the obtaining of a
blessed life,--that one great object toward which the labor,
vigilance, and industry of all philosophers seem to have been
directed,--or whether (as some yet more favorable to him suppose) he
did it because he was unwilling that minds defiled with earthly
desires should essay to raise themselves upward to divine things. For
he saw that the causes of things were sought for by them,--which
causes he believed to be ultimately reducible to nothing else than the
will of the one true and supreme God,--and on this account he thought
they could only be comprehended by a purified mind; and therefore that
all diligence ought to be given to the purification of the life by
good morals, in order that the mind, delivered from the depressing
weight of lusts, might raise itself upward by its native vigor to
eternal things, and might, with purified understanding, contemplate
that nature which is incorporeal and unchangeable light, where live
the causes of all created natures. It is evident, however, that he
hunted out and pursued, with a wonderful pleasantness of style and
argument, and with a most pointed and insinuating urbanity, the
foolishness of ignorant men, who thought that they knew this or
that,--sometimes confessing his own ignorance, and sometimes
dissimulating his knowledge, even in those very moral questions to
which he seems to have directed the whole force of his mind. And
hence there arose hostility against him, which ended in his being
calumniously impeached, and condemned to death. Afterwards, however,
that very city of the Athenians, which had publicly condemned him, did
publicly bewail him,--the popular indignation having turned with such
vehemence on his accusers, that one of them perished by the violence
of the multitude, whilst the other only escaped a like punishment by
voluntary and perpetual exile.
Illustrious, therefore, both in his life and in his death, Socrates
left very many disciples of his philosophy, who vied with one another
in desire for proficiency in handling those moral questions which
concern the chief good (summum bonum), the possession of which can
make a man blessed; and because, in the disputations of Socrates,
where he raises all manner of questions, makes assertions, and then
demolishes them, it did not evidently appear what he held to be the
chief good, every one took from these disputations what pleased him
best, and every one placed the final good [298] in whatever it
appeared to himself to consist. Now, that which is called the final
good is that at which, when one has arrived, he is blessed. But so
diverse were the opinions held by those followers of Socrates
concerning this final good, that (a thing scarcely to be credited with
respect to the followers of one master) some placed the chief good in
pleasure, as Aristippus, others in virtue, as Antisthenes. Indeed, it
were tedious to recount the various opinions of various disciples.
Footnotes
[298] Finem boni.
Chapter 4.--Concerning Plato, the Chief Among the Disciples of
Socrates, and His Threefold Division of Philosophy.
But, among the disciples of Socrates, Plato was the one who shone with
a glory which far excelled that of the others, and who not unjustly
eclipsed them all. By birth, an Athenian of honorable parentage, he
far surpassed his fellow-disciples in natural endowments, of which he
was possessed in a wonderful degree. Yet, deeming himself and the
Socratic discipline far from sufficient for bringing philosophy to
perfection, he travelled as extensively as he was able, going to every
place famed for the cultivation of any science of which he could make
himself master. Thus he learned from the Egyptians whatever they held
and taught as important; and from Egypt, passing into those parts of
Italy which were filled with the fame of the Pythagoreans, he
mastered, with the greatest facility, and under the most eminent
teachers, all the Italic philosophy which was then in vogue. And, as
he had a peculiar love for his master Socrates, he made him the
speaker in all his dialogues, putting into his mouth whatever he had
learned, either from others, or from the efforts of his own powerful
intellect, tempering even his moral disputations with the grace and
politeness of the Socratic style. And, as the study of wisdom
consists in action and contemplation, so that one part of it may be
called active, and the other contemplative,--the active part having
reference to the conduct of life, that is, to the regulation of
morals, and the contemplative part to the investigation into the
causes of nature and into pure truth,--Socrates is said to have
excelled in the active part of that study, while Pythagoras gave more
attention to its contemplative part, on which he brought to bear all
the force of his great intellect. To Plato is given the praise of
having perfected philosophy by combining both parts into one. He then
divides it into three parts,--the first moral, which is chiefly
occupied with action; the second natural, of which the object is
contemplation; and the third rational, which discriminates between the
true and the false. And though this last is necessary both to action
and contemplation, it is contemplation, nevertheless, which lays
peculiar claim to the office of investigating the nature of truth.
Thus this tripartite division is not contrary to that which made the
study of wisdom to consist in action and contemplation. Now, as to
what Plato thought with respect to each of these parts,--that is, what
he believed to be the end of all actions, the cause of all natures,
and the light of all intelligences,--it would be a question too long
to discuss, and about which we ought not to make any rash
affirmation. For, as Plato liked and constantly affected the
well-known method of his master Socrates, namely, that of
dissimulating his knowledge or his opinions, it is not easy to
discover clearly what he himself thought on various matters, any more
than it is to discover what were the real opinions of Socrates. We
must, nevertheless, insert into our work certain of those opinions
which he expresses in his writings, whether he himself uttered them,
or narrates them as expressed by others, and seems himself to approve
of,--opinions sometimes favorable to the true religion, which our
faith takes up and defends, and sometimes contrary to it, as, for
example, in the questions concerning the existence of one God or of
many, as it relates to the truly blessed life which is to be after
death. For those who are praised as having most closely followed
Plato, who is justly preferred to all the other philosophers of the
Gentiles, and who are said to have manifested the greatest acuteness
in understanding him, do perhaps entertain such an idea of God as to
admit that in Him are to be found the cause of existence, the ultimate
reason for the understanding, and the end in reference to which the
whole life is to be regulated. Of which three things, the first is
understood to pertain to the natural, the second to the rational, and
the third to the moral part of philosophy. For if man has been so
created as to attain, through that which is most excellent in him, to
that which excels all things,--that is, to the one true and absolutely
good God, without whom no nature exists, no doctrine instructs, no
exercise profits,--let Him be sought in whom all things are secure to
us, let Him be discovered in whom all truth becomes certain to us, let
Him be loved in whom all becomes right to us.
Chapter 5.--That It is Especially with the Platonists that We Must
Carry on Our Disputations on Matters of Theology, Their Opinions Being
Preferable to Those of All Other Philosophers.
If, then, Plato defined the wise man as one who imitates, knows, loves
this God, and who is rendered blessed through fellowship with Him in
His own blessedness, why discuss with the other philosophers? It is
evident that none come nearer to us than the Platonists. To them,
therefore, let that fabulous theology give place which delights the
minds of men with the crimes of the gods; and that civil theology
also, in which impure demons, under the name of gods, have seduced the
peoples of the earth given up to earthly pleasures, desiring to be
honored by the errors of men, and by filling the minds of their
worshippers with impure desires, exciting them to make the
representation of their crimes one of the rites of their worship,
whilst they themselves found in the spectators of these exhibitions a
most pleasing spectacle,--a theology in which, whatever was honorable
in the temple, was defiled by its mixture with the obscenity of the
theatre, and whatever was base in the theatre was vindicated by the
abominations of the temples. To these philosophers also the
interpretations of Varro must give place, in which he explains the
sacred rites as having reference to heaven and earth, and to the seeds
and operations of perishable things; for, in the first place, those
rites have not the signification which he would have men believe is
attached to them, and therefore truth does not follow him in his
attempt so to interpret them; and even if they had this signification,
still those things ought not to be worshipped by the rational soul as
its god which are placed below it in the scale of nature, nor ought
the soul to prefer to itself as gods things to which the true God has
given it the preference. The same must be said of those writings
pertaining to the sacred rites, which Numa Pompilius took care to
conceal by causing them to be buried along with himself, and which,
when they were afterwards turned up by the plough, were burned by
order of the senate. And, to treat Numa with all honor, let us
mention as belonging to the same rank as these writings that which
Alexander of Macedon wrote to his mother as communicated to him by
Leo, an Egyptian high priest. In this letter not only Picus and
Faunus, and Æneas and Romulus or even Hercules, and Æsculapius and
Liber, born of Semele, and the twin sons of Tyndareus, or any other
mortals who have been deified, but even the principal gods themselves,
[299] to whom Cicero, in his Tusculan questions, [300] alludes without
mentioning their names, Jupiter, Juno, Saturn, Vulcan, Vesta, and many
others whom Varro attempts to identify with the parts or the elements
of the world, are shown to have been men. There is, as we have said,
a similarity between this case and that of Numa; for the priest being
afraid because he had revealed a mystery, earnestly begged of
Alexander to command his mother to burn the letter which conveyed
these communications to her. Let these two theologies, then, the
fabulous and the civil, give place to the Platonic philosophers, who
have recognized the true God as the author of all things, the source
of the light of truth, and the bountiful bestower of all blessedness.
And not these only, but to these great acknowledgers of so great a
God, those philosophers must yield who, having their mind enslaved to
their body, supposed the principles of all things to be material; as
Thales, who held that the first principle of all things was water;
Anaximenes, that it was air; the Stoics, that it was fire; Epicurus,
who affirmed that it consisted of atoms, that is to say, of minute
corpuscules; and many others whom it is needless to enumerate, but who
believed that bodies, simple or compound, animate or inanimate, but
nevertheless bodies, were the cause and principle of all things. For
some of them--as, for instance, the Epicureans--believed that living
things could originate from things without life; others held that all
things living or without life spring from a living principle, but
that, nevertheless, all things, being material, spring from a material
principle. For the Stoics thought that fire, that is, one of the four
material elements of which this visible world is composed, was both
living and intelligent, the maker of the world and of all things
contained in it,--that it was in fact God. These and others like them
have only been able to suppose that which their hearts enslaved to
sense have vainly suggested to them. And yet they have within
themselves something which they could not see: they represented to
themselves inwardly things which they had seen without, even when they
were not seeing them, but only thinking of them. But this
representation in thought is no longer a body, but only the similitude
of a body; and that faculty of the mind by which this similitude of a
body is seen is neither a body nor the similitude of a body; and the
faculty which judges whether the representation is beautiful or ugly
is without doubt superior to the object judged of. This principle is
the understanding of man, the rational soul; and it is certainly not a
body, since that similitude of a body which it beholds and judges of
is itself not a body. The soul is neither earth, nor water, nor air,
nor fire, of which four bodies, called the four elements, we see that
this world is composed. And if the soul is not a body, how should
God, its Creator, be a body? Let all those philosophers, then, give
place, as we have said, to the Platonists, and those also who have
been ashamed to say that God is a body, but yet have thought that our
souls are of the same nature as God. They have not been staggered by
the great changeableness of the soul,--an attribute which it would be
impious to ascribe to the divine nature,--but they say it is the body
which changes the soul, for in itself it is unchangeable. As well
might they say, "Flesh is wounded by some body, for in itself it is
invulnerable." In a word, that which is unchangeable can be changed
by nothing, so that that which can be changed by the body cannot
properly be said to be immutable.
Footnotes
[299] Dii majorum gentium.
[300] Book i. 13.
Chapter 6.--Concerning the Meaning of the Platonists in that Part of
Philosophy Called Physical.
These philosophers, then, whom we see not undeservedly exalted above
the rest in fame and glory, have seen that no material body is God,
and therefore they have transcended all bodies in seeking for God.
They have seen that whatever is changeable is not the most high God,
and therefore they have transcended every soul and all changeable
spirits in seeking the supreme. They have seen also that, in every
changeable thing, the form which makes it that which it is, whatever
be its mode or nature, can only be through Him who truly is, because
He is unchangeable. And therefore, whether we consider the whole body
of the world, its figure, qualities, and orderly movement, and also
all the bodies which are in it; or whether we consider all life,
either that which nourishes and maintains, as the life of trees, or
that which, besides this, has also sensation, as the life of beasts;
or that which adds to all these intelligence, as the life of man; or
that which does not need the support of nutriment, but only maintains,
feels, understands, as the life of angels,--all can only be through
Him who absolutely is. For to Him it is not one thing to be, and
another to live, as though He could be, not living; nor is it to Him
one thing to live, and another thing to understand, as though He could
live, not understanding; nor is it to Him one thing to understand,
another thing to be blessed, as though He could understand and not be
blessed. But to Him to live, to understand, to be blessed, are to
be. They have understood, from this unchangeableness and this
simplicity, that all things must have been made by Him, and that He
could Himself have been made by none. For they have considered that
whatever is is either body or life, and that life is something better
than body, and that the nature of body is sensible, and that of life
intelligible. Therefore they have preferred the intelligible nature
to the sensible. We mean by sensible things such things as can be
perceived by the sight and touch of the body; by intelligible things,
such as can be understood by the sight of the mind. For there is no
corporeal beauty, whether in the condition of a body, as figure, or in
its movement, as in music, of which it is not the mind that judges.
But this could never have been, had there not existed in the mind
itself a superior form of these things, without bulk, without noise of
voice, without space and time. But even in respect of these things,
had the mind not been mutable, it would not have been possible for one
to judge better than another with regard to sensible forms. He who is
clever, judges better than he who is slow, he who is skilled than he
who is unskillful, he who is practised than he who is unpractised; and
the same person judges better after he has gained experience than he
did before. But that which is capable of more and less is mutable;
whence able men, who have thought deeply on these things, have
gathered that the first form is not to be found in those things whose
form is changeable. Since, therefore, they saw that body and mind
might be more or less beautiful in form, and that, if they wanted
form, they could have no existence, they saw that there is some
existence in which is the first form, unchangeable, and therefore not
admitting of degrees of comparison, and in that they most rightly
believed was the first principle of things which was not made, and by
which all things were made. Therefore that which is known of God He
manifested to them when His invisible things were seen by them, being
understood by those things which have been made; also His eternal
power and Godhead by whom all visible and temporal things have been
created. [301]We have said enough upon that part of theology which
they call physical, that is, natural.
Footnotes
[301] Rom. i. 19, 20.
Chapter 7.--How Much the Platonists are to Be Held as Excelling Other
Philosophers in Logic, i.e. Rational Philosophy.
Then, again, as far as regards the doctrine which treats of that which
they call logic, that is, rational philosophy, far be it from us to
compare them with those who attributed to the bodily senses the
faculty of discriminating truth, and thought, that all we learn is to
be measured by their untrustworthy and fallacious rules. Such were
the Epicureans, and all of the same school. Such also were the
Stoics, who ascribed to the bodily senses that expertness in
disputation which they so ardently love, called by them dialectic,
asserting that from the senses the mind conceives the notions
(ennoiai) of those things which they explicate by definition. And
hence is developed the whole plan and connection of their learning and
teaching. I often wonder, with respect to this, how they can say that
none are beautiful but the wise; for by what bodily sense have they
perceived that beauty, by what eyes of the flesh have they seen
wisdom's comeliness of form? Those, however, whom we justly rank
before all others, have distinguished those things which are conceived
by the mind from those which are perceived by the senses, neither
taking away from the senses anything to which they are competent, nor
attributing to them anything beyond their competency. And the light
of our understandings, by which all things are learned by us, they
have affirmed to be that selfsame God by whom all things were made.
Chapter 8.--That the Platonists Hold the First Rank in Moral
Philosophy Also.
The remaining part of philosophy is morals, or what is called by the
Greeks ethike, in which is discussed the question concerning the chief
good,--that which will leave us nothing further to seek in order to be
blessed, if only we make all our actions refer to it, and seek it not
for the sake of something else, but for its own sake. Therefore it is
called the end, because we wish other things on account of it, but
itself only for its own sake. This beatific good, therefore,
according to some, comes to a man from the body, according to others,
from the mind, and, according to others, from both together. For they
saw that man himself consists of soul and body; and therefore they
believed that from either of these two, or from both together, their
well-being must proceed, consisting in a certain final good, which
could render them blessed, and to which they might refer all their
actions, not requiring anything ulterior to which to refer that good
itself. This is why those who have added a third kind of good things,
which they call extrinsic,--as honor, glory, wealth, and the
like,--have not regarded them as part of the final good, that is, to
be sought after for their own sake, but as things which are to be
sought for the sake of something else, affirming that this kind of
good is good to the good, and evil to the evil. Wherefore, whether
they have sought the good of man from the mind or from the body, or
from both together, it is still only from man they have supposed that
it must be sought. But they who have sought it from the body have
sought it from the inferior part of man; they who have sought it from
the mind, from the superior part; and they who have sought it from
both, from the whole man. Whether therefore, they have sought it from
any part, or from the whole man, still they have only sought it from
man; nor have these differences, being three, given rise only to three
dissentient sects of philosophers, but to many. For diverse
philosophers have held diverse opinions, both concerning the good of
the body, and the good of the mind, and the good of both together.
Let, therefore, all these give place to those philosophers who have
not affirmed that a man is blessed by the enjoyment of the body, or by
the enjoyment of the mind, but by the enjoyment of God,--enjoying Him,
however, not as the mind does the body or itself, or as one friend
enjoys another, but as the eye enjoys light, if, indeed, we may draw
any comparison between these things. But what the nature of this
comparison is, will, if God help me, be shown in another place, to the
best of my ability. At present, it is sufficient to mention that
Plato determined the final good to be to live according to virtue, and
affirmed that he only can attain to virtue who knows and imitates
God,--which knowledge and imitation are the only cause of
blessedness. Therefore he did not doubt that to philosophize is to
love God, whose nature is incorporeal. Whence it certainly follows
that the student of wisdom, that is, the philosopher, will then become
blessed when he shall have begun to enjoy God. For though he is not
necessarily blessed who enjoys that which he loves (for many are
miserable by loving that which ought not to be loved, and still more
miserable when they enjoy it), nevertheless no one is blessed who does
not enjoy that which he loves. For even they who love things which
ought not to be loved do not count themselves blessed by loving
merely, but by enjoying them. Who, then, but the most miserable will
deny that he is blessed, who enjoys that which he loves, and loves the
true and highest good? But the true and highest good, according to
Plato, is God, and therefore he would call him a philosopher who loves
God; for philosophy is directed to the obtaining of the blessed life,
and he who loves God is blessed in the enjoyment of God.
Chapter 9.--Concerning that Philosophy Which Has Come Nearest to the
Christian Faith.
Whatever philosophers, therefore, thought concerning the supreme God,
that He is both the maker of all created things, the light by which
things are known, and the good in reference to which things are to be
done; that we have in Him the first principle of nature, the truth of
doctrine, and the happiness of life,--whether these philosophers may
be more suitably called Platonists, or whether they may give some
other name to their sect; whether, we say, that only the chief men of
the Ionic school, such as Plato himself, and they who have well
understood him, have thought thus; or whether we also include the
Italic school, on account of Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans, and all
who may have held like opinions; and, lastly, whether also we include
all who have been held wise men and philosophers among all nations who
are discovered to have seen and taught this, be they Atlantics,
Libyans, Egyptians, Indians, Persians, Chaldeans, Scythians, Gauls,
Spaniards, or of other nations,--we prefer these to all other
philosophers, and confess that they approach nearest to us.
Chapter 10.--That the Excellency of the Christian Religion is Above
All the Science of Philosophers.
For although a Christian man instructed only in ecclesiastical
literature may perhaps be ignorant of the very name of Platonists, and
may not even know that there have existed two schools of philosophers
speaking the Greek tongue, to wit, the Ionic and Italic, he is
nevertheless not so deaf with respect to human affairs, as not to know
that philosophers profess the study, and even the possession, of
wisdom. He is on his guard, however, with respect to those who
philosophize according to the elements of this world, not according to
God, by whom the world itself was made; for he is warned by the
precept of the apostle, and faithfully hears what has been said,
"Beware that no one deceive you through philosophy and vain deceit,
according to the elements of the world." [302]Then, that he may not
suppose that all philosophers are such as do this, he hears the same
apostle say concerning certain of them, "Because that which is known
of God is manifest among them, for God has manifested it to them. For
His invisible things from the creation of the world are clearly seen,
being understood by the things which are made, also His eternal power
and Godhead." [303]And, when speaking to the Athenians, after
having spoken a mighty thing concerning God, which few are able to
understand, "In Him we live, and move, and have our being," [304] he
goes on to say, "As certain also of your own have said." He knows
well, too, to be on his guard against even these philosophers in their
errors. For where it has been said by him, "that God has manifested
to them by those things which are made His invisible things, that they
might be seen by the understanding," there it has also been said that
they did not rightly worship God Himself, because they paid divine
honors, which are due to Him alone, to other things also to which they
ought not to have paid them,--"because, knowing God, they glorified
Him not as God: neither were thankful, but became vain in their
imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened. Professing
themselves to be wise, they became fools, and changed the glory of the
incorruptible God into the likeness of the image of corruptible man,
and of birds, and fourfooted beasts, and creeping things;" [305]
--where the apostle would have us understand him as meaning the
Romans, and Greeks, and Egyptians, who gloried in the name of wisdom;
but concerning this we will dispute with them afterwards. With
respect, however, to that wherein they agree with us we prefer them to
all others namely, concerning the one God, the author of this
universe, who is not only above every body, being incorporeal, but
also above all souls, being incorruptible--our principle, our light,
our good. And though the Christian man, being ignorant of their
writings, does not use in disputation words which he has not
learned,--not calling that part of philosophy natural (which is the
Latin term), or physical (which is the Greek one), which treats of the
investigation of nature; or that part rational, or logical, which
deals with the question how truth may be discovered; or that part
moral, or ethical, which concerns morals, and shows how good is to be
sought, and evil to be shunned,--he is not, therefore, ignorant that
it is from the one true and supremely good God that we have that
nature in which we are made in the image of God, and that doctrine by
which we know Him and ourselves, and that grace through which, by
cleaving to Him, we are blessed. This, therefore, is the cause why we
prefer these to all the others, because, whilst other philosophers
have worn out their minds and powers in seeking the causes of things,
and endeavoring to discover the right mode of learning and of living,
these, by knowing God, have found where resides the cause by which the
universe has been constituted, and the light by which truth is to be
discovered, and the fountain at which felicity is to be drunk. All
philosophers, then, who have had these thoughts concerning God,
whether Platonists or others, agree with us. But we have thought it
better to plead our cause with the Platonists, because their writings
are better known. For the Greeks, whose tongue holds the highest
place among the languages of the Gentiles, are loud in their praises
of these writings; and the Latins, taken with their excellence, or
their renown, have studied them more heartily than other writings,
and, by translating them into our tongue, have given them greater
celebrity and notoriety.
Footnotes
[302] Col. ii. 8.
[303] Rom. i. 19, 20.
[304] Acts xvii. 28.
[305] Rom. i. 21-23.
Chapter 11.--How Plato Has Been Able to Approach So Nearly to
Christian Knowledge.
Certain partakers with us in the grace of Christ, wonder when they
hear and read that Plato had conceptions concerning God, in which they
recognize considerable agreement with the truth of our religion. Some
have concluded from this, that when he went to Egypt he had heard the
prophet Jeremiah, or, whilst travelling in the same country, had read
the prophetic scriptures, which opinion I myself have expressed in
certain of my writings. [306]But a careful calculation of dates,
contained in chronological history, shows that Plato was born about a
hundred years after the time in which Jeremiah prophesied, and, as he
lived eighty-one years, there are found to have been about seventy
years from his death to that time when Ptolemy, king of Egypt,
requested the prophetic scriptures of the Hebrew people to be sent to
him from Judea, and committed them to seventy Hebrews, who also knew
the Greek tongue, to be translated and kept. Therefore, on that
voyage of his, Plato could neither have seen Jeremiah, who was dead so
long before, nor have read those same scriptures which had not yet
been translated into the Greek language, of which he was a master,
unless, indeed, we say that, as he was most earnest in the pursuit of
knowledge, he also studied those writings through an interpreter, as
he did those of the Egyptians,--not, indeed, writing a translation of
them (the facilities for doing which were only gained even by Ptolemy
in return for munificent acts of kindness, [307] though fear of his
kingly authority might have seemed a sufficient motive), but learning
as much as he possibly could concerning their contents by means of
conversation. What warrants this supposition are the opening verses
of Genesis: "In the beginning God made the heaven and earth. And the
earth was invisible, and without order; and darkness was over the
abyss: and the Spirit of God moved over the waters." [308]For in
the Timæus, when writing on the formation of the world, he says that
God first united earth and fire; from which it is evident that he
assigns to fire a place in heaven. This opinion bears a certain
resemblance to the statement, "In the beginning God made heaven and
earth." Plato next speaks of those two intermediary elements, water
and air, by which the other two extremes, namely, earth and fire, were
mutually united; from which circumstance he is thought to have so
understood the words, "The Spirit of God moved over the waters." For,
not paying sufficient attention to the designations given by those
scriptures to the Spirit of God, he may have thought that the four
elements are spoken of in that place, because the air also is called
spirit. [309]Then, as to Plato's saying that the philosopher is a
lover of God, nothing shines forth more conspicuously in those sacred
writings. But the most striking thing in this connection, and that
which most of all inclines me almost to assent to the opinion that
Plato was not ignorant of those writings, is the answer which was
given to the question elicited from the holy Moses when the words of
God were conveyed to him by the angel; for, when he asked what was the
name of that God who was commanding him to go and deliver the Hebrew
people out of Egypt, this answer was given: "I am who am; and thou
shalt say to the children of Israel, He who is sent me unto you;"
[310] as though compared with Him that truly is, because He is
unchangeable, those things which have been created mutable are not,--a
truth which Plato zealously held, and most diligently commended. And
I know not whether this sentiment is anywhere to be found in the books
of those who were before Plato, unless in that book where it is said,
"I am who am; and thou shalt say to the children of Israel, who is
sent me unto you."
Footnotes
[306] De Doctrina Christiana, ii. 43. Comp. Retract. ii. 4, 2.
[307] Liberating Jewish slaves, and sending gifts to the temple. See
Josephus, Ant. xii. 2.
[308] Gen. i. 1, 2.
[309] Spiritus.
[310] Ex. iii. 14.
Chapter 12.--That Even the Platonists, Though They Say These Things
Concerning the One True God, Nevertheless Thought that Sacred Rites
Were to Be Performed in Honor of Many Gods.
But we need not determine from what source he learned these
things,--whether it was from the books of the ancients who preceded
him, or, as is more likely, from the words of the apostle: "Because
that which is known of God, has been manifested among them, for God
hath manifested it to them. For His invisible things from the
creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by those
things which have been made, also His eternal power and Godhead."
[311]From whatever source he may have derived this knowledge, then,
I think I have made it sufficiently plain that I have not chosen the
Platonic philosophers undeservedly as the parties with whom to
discuss; because the question we have just taken up concerns the
natural theology,--the question, namely, whether sacred rites are to
be performed to one God, or to many, for the sake of the happiness
which is to be after death. I have specially chosen them because
their juster thoughts concerning the one God who made heaven and
earth, have made them illustrious among philosophers. This has given
them such superiority to all others in the judgment of posterity,
that, though Aristotle, the disciple of Plato, a man of eminent
abilities, inferior in eloquence to Plato, yet far superior to many in
that respect, had founded the Peripatetic sect,--so called because
they were in the habit of walking about during their
disputations,--and though he had, through the greatness of his fame,
gathered very many disciples into his school, even during the life of
his master; and though Plato at his death was succeeded in his school,
which was called the Academy, by Speusippus, his sister's son, and
Xenocrates, his beloved disciple, who, together with their successors,
were called from this name of the school, Academics; nevertheless the
most illustrious recent philosophers, who have chosen to follow Plato,
have been unwilling to be called Peripatetics, or Academics, but have
preferred the name of Platonists. Among these were the renowned
Plotinus, Iamblichus, and Porphyry, who were Greeks, and the African
Apuleius, who was learned both in the Greek and Latin tongues. All
these, however, and the rest who were of the same school, and also
Plato himself, thought that sacred rites ought to be performed in
honor of many gods.
Footnotes
[311] Rom. i. 20.
Chapter 13.--Concerning the Opinion of Plato, According to Which He
Defined the Gods as Beings Entirely Good and the Friends of Virtue.
Therefore, although in many other important respects they differ from
us, nevertheless with respect to this particular point of difference,
which I have just stated, as it is one of great moment, and the
question on hand concerns it, I will first ask them to what gods they
think that sacred rites are to be performed,--to the good or to the
bad, or to both the good and the bad? But we have the opinion of
Plato affirming that all the gods are good, and that there is not one
of the gods bad. It follows, therefore, that these are to be
performed to the good, for then they are performed to gods; for if
they are not good, neither are they gods. Now, if this be the case
(for what else ought we to believe concerning the gods?), certainly it
explodes the opinion that the bad gods are to be propitiated by sacred
rites in order that they may not harm us, but the good gods are to be
invoked in order that they may assist us. For there are no bad gods,
and it is to the good that, as they say, the due honor of such rites
is to be paid. Of what character, then, are those gods who love
scenic displays, even demanding that a place be given them among
divine things, and that they be exhibited in their honor? The power
of these gods proves that they exist, but their liking such things
proves that they are bad. For it is well-known what Plato's opinion
was concerning scenic plays. He thinks that the poets themselves,
because they have composed songs so unworthy of the majesty and
goodness of the gods, ought to be banished from the state. Of what
character, therefore, are those gods who contend with Plato himself
about those scenic plays? He does not suffer the gods to be defamed
by false crimes; the gods command those same crimes to be celebrated
in their own honor.
In fine, when they ordered these plays to be inaugurated, they not
only demanded base things, but also did cruel things, taking from
Titus Latinius his son, and sending a disease upon him because he had
refused to obey them, which they removed when he had fulfilled their
commands. Plato, however, bad though they were, did not think they
were to be feared; but, holding to his opinion with the utmost
firmness and constancy, does not hesitate to remove from a
well-ordered state all the sacrilegious follies of the poets, with
which these gods are delighted because they themselves are impure.
But Labeo places this same Plato (as I have mentioned already in the
second book [312] ) among the demi-gods. Now Labeo thinks that the
bad deities are to be propitiated with bloody victims, and by fasts
accompanied with the same, but the good deities with plays, and all
other things which are associated with joyfulness. How comes it,
then, that the demi-god Plato so persistently dares to take away those
pleasures, because he deems them base, not from the demi-gods but from
the gods, and these the good gods? And, moreover, those very gods
themselves do certainly refute the opinion of Labeo, for they showed
themselves in the case of Latinius to be not only wanton and sportive,
but also cruel and terrible. Let the Platonists, therefore, explain
these things to us, since, following the opinion of their master, they
think that all the gods are good and honorable, and friendly to the
virtues of the wise, holding it unlawful to think otherwise concerning
any of the gods. We will explain it, say they. Let us then
attentively listen to them.
Footnotes
[312] Ch. 14.
Chapter 14.--Of the Opinion of Those Who Have Said that Rational Souls
are of Three Kinds, to Wit, Those of the Celestial Gods, Those of the
Aerial Demons, and Those of Terrestrial Men.
There is, say they, a threefold division of all animals endowed with a
rational soul, namely, into gods, men, and demons. The gods occupy
the loftiest region, men the lowest, the demons the middle region.
For the abode of the gods is heaven, that of men the earth, that of
the demons the air. As the dignity of their regions is diverse, so
also is that of their natures; therefore the gods are better than men
and demons. Men have been placed below the gods and demons, both in
respect of the order of the regions they inhabit, and the difference
of their merits. The demons, therefore, who hold the middle place, as
they are inferior to the gods, than whom they inhabit a lower region,
so they are superior to men, than whom they inhabit a loftier one.
For they have immortality of body in common with the gods, but
passions of the mind in common with men. On which account, say they,
it is not wonderful that they are delighted with the obscenities of
the theatre, and the fictions of the poets, since they are also
subject to human passions, from which the gods are far removed, and to
which they are altogether strangers. Whence we conclude that it was
not the gods, who are all good and highly exalted, that Plato deprived
of the pleasure of theatric plays, by reprobating and prohibiting the
fictions of the poets, but the demons.
Of these things many have written: among others Apuleius, the
Platonist of Madaura, who composed a whole work on the subject,
entitled, Concerning the God of Socrates. He there discusses and
explains of what kind that deity was who attended on Socrates, a sort
of familiar, by whom it is said he was admon ished to desist from any
action which would not turn out to his advantage. He asserts most
distinctly, and proves at great length, that it was not a god but a
demon; and he discusses with great diligence the opinion of Plato
concerning the lofty estate of the gods, the lowly estate of men, and
the middle estate of demons. These things being so, how did Plato
dare to take away, if not from the gods, whom he removed from all
human contagion, certainly from the demons, all the pleasures of the
theatre, by expelling the poets from the state? Evidently in this way
he wished to admonish the human soul, although still confined in these
moribund members, to despise the shameful commands of the demons, and
to detest their impurity, and to choose rather the splendor of
virtue. But if Plato showed himself virtuous in answering and
prohibiting these things, then certainly it was shameful of the demons
to command them. Therefore either Apuleius is wrong, and Socrates'
familiar did not belong to this class of deities, or Plato held
contradictory opinions, now honoring the demons, now removing from the
well-regulated state the things in which they delighted, or Socrates
is not to be congratulated on the friendship of the demon, of which
Apuleius was so ashamed that he entitled his book On the God of
Socrates, whilst according to the tenor of his discussion, wherein he
so diligently and at such length distinguishes gods from demons, he
ought not to have entitled it, Concerning the God, but Concerning the
Demon of Socrates. But he preferred to put this into the discussion
itself rather than into the title of his book. For, through the sound
doctrine which has illuminated human society, all, or almost all men
have such a horror at the name of demons, that every one who before
reading the dissertation of Apuleius, which sets forth the dignity of
demons, should have read the title of the book, On the Demon of
Socrates, would certainly have thought that the author was not a sane
man. But what did even Apuleius find to praise in the demons, except
subtlety and strength of body and a higher place of habitation? For
when he spoke generally concerning their manners, he said nothing that
was good, but very much that was bad. Finally, no one, when he has
read that book, wonders that they desired to have even the obscenity
of the stage among divine things, or that, wishing to be thought gods,
they should be delighted with the crimes of the gods, or that all
those sacred solemnities, whose obscenity occasions laughter, and
whose shameful cruelty causes horror, should be in agreement with
their passions.
Chapter 15.--That the Demons are Not Better Than Men Because of Their
Aerial Bodies, or on Account of Their Superior Place of Abode.
Wherefore let not the mind truly religious, and submitted to the true
God, suppose that demons are better than men, because they have better
bodies. Otherwise it must put many beasts before itself which are
superior to us both in acuteness of the senses, in ease and quickness
of movement, in strength and in long-continued vigor of body. What
man can equal the eagle or the vulture in strength of vision? Who can
equal the dog in acuteness of smell? Who can equal the hare, the
stag, and all the birds in swiftness? Who can equal in strength the
lion or the elephant? Who can equal in length of life the serpents,
which are affirmed to put off old age along with their skin, and to
return to youth again? But as we are better than all these by the
possession of reason and understanding, so we ought also to be better
than the demons by living good and virtuous lives. For divine
providence gave to them bodies of a better quality than ours, that
that in which we excel them might in this way be commended to us as
deserving to be far more cared for than the body, and that we should
learn to despise the bodily excellence of the demons compared with
goodness of life, in respect of which we are better than they, knowing
that we too shall have immortality of body,--not an immortality
tortured by eternal punishment, but that which is consequent on purity
of soul.
But now, as regards loftiness of place, it is altogether ridiculous to
be so influenced by the fact that the demons inhabit the air, and we
the earth, as to think that on that account they are to be put before
us; for in this way we put all the birds before ourselves. But the
birds, when they are weary with flying, or require to repair their
bodies with food, come back to the earth to rest or to feed, which the
demons, they say, do not. Are they, therefore, inclined to say that
the birds are superior to us, and the demons superior to the birds?
But if it be madness to think so, there is no reason why we should
think that, on account of their inhabiting a loftier element, the
demons have a claim to our religious submission. But as it is really
the case that the birds of the air are not only not put before us who
dwell on the earth; but are even subjected to us on account of the
dignity of the rational soul which is in us, so also it is the case
that the demons, though they are aerial, are not better than we who
are terrestrial because the air is higher than the earth, but, on the
contrary, men are to be put before demons because their despair is not
to be compared to the hope of pious men. Even that law of Plato's,
according to which he mutually orders and arranges the four elements,
inserting between the two extreme elements--namely, fire, which is in
the highest degree mobile, and the immoveable earth--the two middle
ones, air and water, that by how much the air is higher up than the
water, and the fire than the air, by so much also are the waters
higher than the earth,--this law, I say, sufficiently admonishes us
not to estimate the merits of animated creatures according to the
grades of the elements. And Apuleius himself says that man is a
terrestrial animal in common with the rest, who is nevertheless to be
put far before aquatic animals, though Plato puts the waters
themselves before the land. By this he would have us understand that
the same order is not to be observed when the question concerns the
merits of animals, though it seems to be the true one in the gradation
of bodies; for it appears to be possible that a soul of a higher order
may inhabit a body of a lower, and a soul of a lower order a body of a
higher.
Chapter 16.--What Apuleius the Platonist Thought Concerning the
Manners and Actions of Demons.
The same Apuleius, when speaking concerning the manners of demons,
said that they are agitated with the same perturbations of mind as
men; that they are provoked by injuries, propitiated by services and
by gifts, rejoice in honors, are delighted with a variety of sacred
rites, and are annoyed if any of them be neglected. Among other
things, he also says that on them depend the divinations of augurs,
soothsayers, and prophets, and the revelations of dreams, and that
from them also are the miracles of the magicians. But, when giving a
brief definition of them, he says, "Demons are of an animal nature,
passive in soul, rational in mind, aerial in body, eternal in time."
"Of which five things, the three first are common to them and us, the
fourth peculiar to themselves, and the fifth common to therewith the
gods." [313]But I see that they have in common with the gods two of
the first things, which they have in common with us. For he says that
the gods also are animals; and when he is assigning to every order of
beings its own element, he places us among the other terrestrial
animals which live and feel upon the earth. Wherefore, if the demons
are animals as to genus, this is common to them, not only with men,
but also with the gods and with beasts; if they are rational as to
their mind, this is common to them with the gods and with men; if they
are eternal in time, this is common to them with the gods only; if
they are passive as to their soul, this is common to them with men
only; if they are aerial in body, in this they are alone. Therefore
it is no great thing for them to be of an animal nature, for so also
are the beasts; in being rational as to mind, they are not above
ourselves, for so are we also; and as to their being eternal as to
time, what is the advantage of that if they are not blessed? for
better is temporal happiness than eternal misery. Again, as to their
being passive in soul, how are they in this respect above us, since we
also are so, but would not have been so had we not been miserable?
Also, as to their being aerial in body, how much value is to be set on
that, since a soul of any kind whatsoever is to be set above every
body? and therefore religious worship, which ought to be rendered from
the soul, is by no means due to that thing which is inferior to the
soul. Moreover, if he had, among those things which he says belong to
demons, enumerated virtue, wisdom, happiness, and affirmed that they
have those things in common with the gods, and, like them, eternally,
he would assuredly have attributed to them something greatly to be
desired, and much to be prized. And even in that case it would not
have been our duty to worship them like God on account of these
things, but rather to worship Him from whom we know they had received
them. But how much less are they really worthy of divine
honor,--those aerial animals who are only rational that they may be
capable of misery, passive that they may be actually miserable, and
eternal that it may be impossible for them to end their misery!
Footnotes
[313] De Deo Socratis.
Chapter 17.--Whether It is Proper that Men Should Worship Those
Spirits from Whose Vices It is Necessary that They Be Freed.
Wherefore, to omit other things, and confine our attention to that
which he says is common to the demons with us, let us ask this
question: If all the four elements are full of their own animals, the
fire and the air of immortal, and the water and the earth of mortal
ones, why are the souls of demons agitated by the whirlwinds and
tempests of passions?--for the Greek word pathos means perturbation,
whence he chose to call the demons "passive in soul," because the word
passion, which is derived from pathos, signified a commotion of the
mind contrary to reason. Why, then, are these things in the minds of
demons which are not in beasts? For if anything of this kind appears
in beasts, it is not perturbation, because it is not contrary to
reason, of which they are devoid. Now it is foolishness or misery
which is the cause of these perturbations in the case of men, for we
are not yet blessed in the possession of that perfection of wisdom
which is promised to us at last, when we shall be set free from our
present mortality. But the gods, they say, are free from these
perturbations, because they are not only eternal, but also blessed;
for they also have the same kind of rational souls, but most pure from
all spot and plague. Wherefore, if the gods are free from
perturbation because they are blessed, not miserable animals, and the
beasts are free from them because they are animals which are capable
neither of blessedness nor misery, it remains that the demons, like
men, are subject to perturbations because they are not blessed but
miserable animals. What folly, therefore, or rather what madness, to
submit ourselves through any sentiment of religion to demons, when it
belongs to the true religion to deliver us from that depravity which
makes us like to them! For Apuleius himself, although he is very
sparing toward them, and thinks they are worthy of divine honors, is
nevertheless compelled to confess that they are subject to anger; and
the true religion commands us not to be moved with anger, but rather
to resist it. The demons are won over by gifts; and the true religion
commands us to favor no one on account of gifts received. The demons
are flattered by honors; but the true religion commands us by no means
to be moved by such things. The demons are haters of some men and
lovers of others, not in consequence of a prudent and calm judgment,
but because of what he calls their "passive soul;" whereas the true
religion commands us to love even our enemies. Lastly, the true
religion commands us to put away all disquietude of heart and
agitation of mind, and also all commotions and tempests of the soul,
which Apuleius asserts to be continually swelling and surging in the
souls of demons. Why, therefore, except through foolishness and
miserable error shouldst thou humble thyself to worship a being to
whom thou desirest to be unlike in thy life? And why shouldst thou
pay religious homage to him whom thou art unwilling to imitate, when
it is the highest duty of religion to imitate Him whom thou
worshippest?
Chapter 18.--What Kind of Religion that is Which Teaches that Men
Ought to Employ the Advocacy of Demons in Order to Be Recommended to
the Favor of the Good Gods.
In vain, therefore, have Apuleius, and they who think with him,
conferred on the demons the honor of placing them in the air, between
the ethereal heavens and the earth, that they may carry to the gods
the prayers of men, to men the answers of the gods: for Plato held,
they say, that no god has intercourse with man. They who believe
these things have thought it unbecoming that men should have
intercourse with the gods, and the gods with men, but a befitting
thing that the demons should have intercourse with both gods and men,
presenting to the gods the petitions of men, and conveying to men what
the gods have granted; so that a chaste man, and one who is a stranger
to the crimes of the magic arts, must use as patrons, through whom the
gods may be induced to hear him, demons who love these crimes,
although the very fact of his not loving them ought to have
recommended him to them as one who deserved to be listened to with
greater readiness and willingness on their part. They love the
abominations of the stage, which chastity does not love. They love,
in the sorceries of the magicians, "a thousand arts of inflicting
harm," [314] which innocence does not love. Yet both chastity and
innocence, if they wish to obtain anything from the gods, will not be
able to do so by their own merits, except their enemies act as
mediators on their behalf. Apuleius need not attempt to justify the
fictions of the poets, and the mockeries of the stage. If human
modesty can act so faithlessly towards itself as not only to love
shameful things, but even to think that they are pleasing to the
divinity, we can cite on the other side their own highest authority
and teacher, Plato.
Footnotes
[314] Virgil, Æn. 7, 338.
Chapter 19.--Of the Impiety of the Magic Art, Which is Dependent on
the Assistance of Malign Spirits.
Moreover, against those magic arts, concerning which some men,
exceedingly wretched and exceedingly impious, delight to boast, may
not public opinion itself be brought forward as a witness? For why
are those arts so severely punished by the laws, if they are the works
of deities who ought to be worshipped? Shall it be said that the
Christians have or dained those laws by which magic arts are
punished? With what other meaning, except that these sorceries are
without doubt pernicious to the human race, did the most illustrious
poet say,
"By heaven, I swear, and your dear life,
Unwillingly these arms I wield,
And take, to meet the coming strife,
Enchantment's sword and shield." [315]
And that also which he says in another place concerning magic arts,
"I've seen him to another place transport the standing corn," [316]
has reference to the fact that the fruits of one field are said to be
transferred to another by these arts which this pestiferous and
accursed doctrine teaches. Does not Cicero inform us that, among the
laws of the Twelve Tables, that is, the most ancient laws of the
Romans, there was a law written which appointed a punishment to be
inflicted on him who should do this? [317]Lastly, was it before
Christian judges that Apuleius himself was accused of magic arts?
[318]Had he known these arts to be divine and pious, and congruous
with the works of divine power, he ought not only to have confessed,
but also to have professed them, rather blaming the laws by which
these things were prohibited and pronounced worthy of condemnation,
while they ought to have been held worthy of admiration and respect.
For by so doing, either he would have persuaded the judges to adopt
his own opinion, or, if they had shown their partiality for unjust
laws, and condemned him to death notwithstanding his praising and
commending such things, the demons would have bestowed on his soul
such rewards as he deserved, who, in order to proclaim and set forth
their divine works, had not feared the loss of his human life. As our
martyrs, when that religion was charged on them as a crime, by which
they knew they were made safe and most glorious throughout eternity,
did not choose, by denying it, to escape temporal punishments, but
rather by confessing, professing, and proclaiming it, by enduring all
things for it with fidelity and fortitude, and by dying for it with
pious calmness, put to shame the law by which that religion was
prohibited, and caused its revocation. But there is extant a most
copious and eloquent oration of this Platonic philosopher, in which he
defends himself against the charge of practising these arts, affirming
that he is wholly a stranger to them, and only wishing to show his
innocence by denying such things as cannot be innocently committed.
But all the miracles of the magicians, who he thinks are justly
deserving of condemnation, are performed according to the teaching and
by the power of demons. Why, then, does he think that they ought to
be honored? For he asserts that they are necessary, in order to
present our prayers to the gods, and yet their works are such as we
must shun if we wish our prayers to reach the true God. Again, I ask,
what kind of prayers of men does he suppose are presented to the good
gods by the demons? If magical prayers, they will have none such; if
lawful prayers, they will not receive them through such beings. But
if a sinner who is penitent pour out prayers, especially if he has
committed any crime of sorcery, does he receive pardon through the
intercession of those demons by whose instigation and help he has
fallen into the sin he mourns? or do the demons themselves, in order
that they may merit pardon for the penitent, first become penitents
because they have deceived them? This no one ever said concerning the
demons; for had this been the case, they would never have dared to
seek for themselves divine honors. For how should they do so who
desired by penitence to obtain the grace of pardon; seeing that such
detestable pride could not exist along with a humility worthy of
pardon?
Footnotes
[315] Virgil, Æn. 4. 492, 493.
[316] Virgil, Ec. 8. 99.
[317] Pliny (Hist. Nat. xxviii. 2) and others quote the law as
running: Qui fruges incantasit, qui malum carmen incantasit...neu
alienam segetem pelexeris.
[318] Before Claudius, the prefect of Africa, a heathen.
Chapter 20.--Whether We are to Believe that the Good Gods are More
Willing to Have Intercourse with Demons Than with Men.
But does any urgent and most pressing cause compel the demons to
mediate between the gods and men, that they may offer the prayers of
men, and bring back the answers from the gods? and if so, what, pray,
is that cause, what is that so great necessity? Because, say they, no
god has intercourse with man. Most admirable holiness of God, which
has no intercourse with a supplicating man, and yet has intercourse
with an arrogant demon! which has no intercourse with a penitent man,
and yet has intercourse with a deceiving demon! which has no
intercourse with a man fleeing for refuge to the divine nature, and
yet has intercourse with a demon feigning divinity! which has no
intercourse with a man seeking pardon, and yet has intercourse with a
demon persuading to wickedness! which has no intercourse with a man
expelling the poets by means of philosophical writings from a
well-regulated state, and yet has intercourse with a demon requesting
from the princes and priests of a state the theatri cal performance of
the mockeries of the poets! which has no intercourse with the man who
prohibits the ascribing of crime to the gods, and yet has intercourse
with a demon who takes delight in the fictitious representation of
their crimes! which has no intercourse with a man punishing the crimes
of the magicians by just laws, and yet has intercourse with a demon
teaching and practising magical arts! which has no intercourse with a
man shunning the imitation of a demon, and yet has intercourse with a
demon lying in wait for the deception of a man!
Chapter 21.--Whether the Gods Use the Demons as Messengers and
Interpreters, and Whether They are Deceived by Them Willingly, or
Without Their Own Knowledge.
But herein, no doubt, lies the great necessity for this absurdity, so
unworthy of the gods, that the ethereal gods, who are concerned about
human affairs, would not know what terrestrial men were doing unless
the aerial demons should bring them intelligence, because the ether is
suspended far away from the earth and far above it, but the air is
contiguous both to the ether and to the earth. O admirable wisdom!
what else do these men think concerning the gods who, they say, are
all in the highest degree good, but that they are concerned about
human affairs, lest they should seem unworthy of worship, whilst, on
the other hand, from the distance between the elements, they are
ignorant of terrestrial things? It is on this account that they have
supposed the demons to be necessary as agents, through whom the gods
may inform themselves with respect to human affairs, and through whom,
when necessary, they may succor men; and it is on account of this
office that the demons themselves have been held as deserving of
worship. If this be the case, then a demon is better known by these
good gods through nearness of body, than a man is by goodness of
mind. O mournful necessity, or shall I not rather say detestable and
vain error, that I may not impute vanity to the divine nature! For if
the gods can, with their minds free from the hindrance of bodies, see
our mind, they do not need the demons as messengers from our mind to
them; but if the ethereal gods, by means of their bodies, perceive the
corporeal indices of minds, as the countenance, speech, motion, and
thence understand what the demons tell them, then it is also possible
that they may be deceived by the falsehoods of demons. Moreover, if
the divinity of the gods cannot be deceived by the demons, neither can
it be ignorant of our actions. But I would they would tell me whether
the demons have informed the gods that the fictions of the poets
concerning the crimes of the gods displease Plato, concealing the
pleasure which they themselves take in them; or whether they have
concealed both, and have preferred that the gods should be ignorant
with respect to this whole matter, or have told both, as well the
pious prudence of Plato with respect to the gods as their own lust,
which is injurious to the gods; or whether they have concealed Plato's
opinion, according to which he was unwilling that the gods should be
defamed with falsely alleged crimes through the impious license of the
poets, whilst they have not been ashamed nor afraid to make known
their own wickedness, which make them love theatrical plays, in which
the infamous deeds of the gods are celebrated. Let them choose which
they will of these four alternatives, and let them consider how much
evil any one of them would require them to think of the gods. For if
they choose the first, they must then confess that it was not possible
for the good gods to dwell with the good Plato, though he sought to
prohibit things injurious to them, whilst they dwelt with evil demons,
who exulted in their injuries; and this because they suppose that the
good gods can only know a good man, placed at so great a distance from
them, through the mediation of evil demons, whom they could know on
account of their nearness to themselves. [319]If they shall choose
the second, and shall say that both these things are concealed by the
demons, so that the gods are wholly ignorant both of Plato's most
religious law and the sacrilegious pleasure of the demons, what, in
that case, can the gods know to any profit with respect to human
affairs through these mediating demons, when they do not know those
things which are decreed, through the piety of good men, for the honor
of the good gods against the lust of evil demons? But if they shall
choose the third, and reply that these intermediary demons have
communicated, not only the opinion of Plato, which prohibited wrongs
to be done to the gods, but also their own delight in these wrongs, I
would ask if such a communication is not rather an insult? Now the
gods, hearing both and knowing both, not only permit the approach of
those malign demons, who desire and do things contrary to the dignity
of the gods and the religion of Plato, but also, through these wicked
demons, who are near to them, send good things to the good Plato, who
is far away from them; for they inhabit such a place in the
concatenated series of the elements, that they can come into contact
with those by whom they are accused, but not with him by whom they are
defended,--knowing the truth on both sides, but not being able to
change the weight of the air and the earth. There remains the fourth
supposition; but it is worse than the rest. For who will suffer it to
be said that the demons have made known the calumnious fictions of the
poets concerning the immortal gods, and also the disgraceful mockeries
of the theatres, and their own most ardent lust after, and most sweet
pleasure in these things, whilst they have concealed from them that
Plato, with the gravity of a philosopher, gave it as his opinion that
all these things ought to be removed from a well-regulated republic;
so that the good gods are now compelled, through such messengers, to
know the evil doings of the most wicked beings, that is to say, of the
messengers themselves, and are not allowed to know the good deeds of
the philosophers, though the former are for the injury, but these
latter for the honor of the gods themselves?
Footnotes
[319] Another reading, whom they could not know, though near to
themselves.
Chapter 22.--That We Must, Notwithstanding the Opinion of Apuleius,
Reject the Worship of Demons.
None of these four alternatives, then, is to be chosen; for we dare
not suppose such unbecoming things concerning the gods as the adoption
of any one of them would lead us to think. It remains, therefore,
that no credence whatever is to be given to the opinion of Apuleius
and the other philosophers of the same school, namely, that the demons
act as messengers and interpreters between the gods and men to carry
our petitions from us to the gods, and to bring back to us the help of
the gods. On the contrary, we must believe them to be spirits most
eager to inflict harm, utterly alien from righteousness, swollen with
pride, pale with envy, subtle in deceit; who dwell indeed in this air
as in a prison, in keeping with their own character, because, cast
down from the height of the higher heaven, they have been condemned to
dwell in this element as the just reward of irretrievable
transgression. But, though the air is situated above the earth and
the waters, they are not on that account superior in merit to men,
who, though they do not surpass them as far as their earthly bodies
are concerned, do nevertheless far excel them through piety of
mind,--they having made choice of the true God as their helper. Over
many, however, who are manifestly unworthy of participation in the
true religion, they tyrannize as over captives whom they have
subdued,--the greatest part of whom they have persuaded of their
divinity by wonderful and lying signs, consisting either of deeds or
of predictions. Some, nevertheless, who have more attentively and
diligently considered their vices, they have not been able to persuade
that they are gods, and so have feigned themselves to be messengers
between the gods and men. Some, indeed, have thought that not even
this latter honor ought to be acknowledged as belonging to them, not
believing that they were gods, because they saw that they were wicked,
whereas the gods, according to their view, are all good. Nevertheless
they dared not say that they were wholly unworthy of all divine honor,
for fear of offending the multitude, by whom, through inveterate
superstition, the demons were served by the performance of many rites,
and the erection of many temples.
Chapter 23.--What Hermes Trismegistus Thought Concerning Idolatry, and
from What Source He Knew that the Superstitions of Egypt Were to Be
Abolished.
The Egyptian Hermes, whom they call Trismegistus, had a different
opinion concerning those demons. Apuleius, indeed, denies that they
are gods; but when he says that they hold a middle place between the
gods and men, so that they seem to be necessary for men as mediators
between them and the gods, he does not distinguish between the worship
due to them and the religious homage due to the supernal gods. This
Egyptian, however, says that there are some gods made by the supreme
God, and some made by men. Any one who hears this, as I have stated
it, no doubt supposes that it has reference to images, because they
are the works of the hands of men; but he asserts that visible and
tangible images are, as it were, only the bodies of the gods, and that
there dwell in them certain spirits, which have been invited to come
into them, and which have power to inflict harm, or to fulfil the
desires of those by whom divine honors and services are rendered to
them. To unite, therefore, by a certain art, those invisible spirits
to visible and material things, so as to make, as it were, animated
bodies, dedicated and given up to those spirits who inhabit
them,--this, he says, is to make gods, adding that men have received
this great and wonderful power. I will give the words of this
Egyptian as they have been translated into our tongue: "And, since we
have undertaken to discourse concerning the relationship and
fellowship between men and the gods, know, O Æsculapius, the power and
strength of man. As the Lord and Father, or that which is highest,
even God, is the maker of the celestial gods, so man is the maker of
the gods who are in the temples, content to dwell near to men." [320]
And a little after he says, "Thus humanity, always mindful of its
nature and origin, perseveres in the imitation of divinity; and as the
Lord and Father made eternal gods, that they should be like Himself,
so humanity fashioned its own gods according to the likeness of its
own countenance." When this Æsculapius, to whom especially he was
speaking, had answered him, and had said, "Dost thou mean the statues,
O Trismegistus?"--"Yes, the statues," replied he, "however unbelieving
thou art, O Æsculapius,--the statues, animated and full of sensation
and spirit, and who do such great and wonderful things,--the statues
prescient of future things, and foretelling them by lot, by prophet,
by dreams, and many other things, who bring diseases on men and cure
them again, giving them joy or sorrow according to their merits. Dost
thou not know, O Æsculapius, that Egypt is an image of heaven, or,
more truly, a translation and descent of all things which are ordered
and transacted there, that it is, in truth, if we may say so, to be
the temple of the whole world? And yet, as it becomes the prudent man
to know all things beforehand, ye ought not to be ignorant of this,
that there is a time coming when it shall appear that the Egyptians
have all in vain, with pious mind, and with most scrupulous diligence,
waited on the divinity, and when all their holy worship shall come to
nought, and be found to be in vain."
Hermes then follows out at great length the statements of this
passage, in which he seems to predict the present time, in which the
Christian religion is overthrowing all lying figments with a vehemence
and liberty proportioned to its superior truth and holiness, in order
that the grace of the true Saviour may deliver men from those gods
which man has made, and subject them to that God by whom man was
made. But when Hermes predicts these things, he speaks as one who is
a friend to these same mockeries of demons, and does not clearly
express the name of Christ. On the contrary, he deplores, as if it
had already taken place, the future abolition of those things by the
observance of which there was maintained in Egypt a resemblance of
heaven,--he bears witness to Christianity by a kind of mournful
prophecy. Now it was with reference to such that the apostle said,
that "knowing God, they glorified Him not as God, neither were
thankful, but became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish
heart was darkened; professing themselves to be wise, they became
fools, and changed the glory of the incorruptible God into the
likeness of the image of corruptible man," [321] and so on, for the
whole passage is too long to quote. For Hermes makes many such
statements agreeable to the truth concerning the one true God who
fashioned this world. And I know not how he has become so bewildered
by that "darkening of the heart" as to stumble into the expression of
a desire that men should always continue in subjection to those gods
which he confesses to be made by men, and to bewail their future
removal; as if there could be anything more wretched than mankind
tyrannized over by the work of his own hands, since man, by
worshipping the works of his own hands, may more easily cease to be
man, than the works of his hands can, through his worship of them,
become gods. For it can sooner happen that man, who has received an
honorable position, may, through lack of understanding, become
comparable to the beasts, than that the works of man may become
preferable to the work of God, made in His own image, that is, to man
himself. Wherefore deservedly is man left to fall away from Him who
made Him, when he prefers to himself that which he himself has made.
For these vain, deceitful, pernicious, sacrilegious things did the
Egyptian Hermes sorrow, because he knew that the time was coming when
they should be removed. But his sorrow was as impudently expressed as
his knowledge was imprudently obtained; for it was not the Holy Spirit
who revealed these things to him, as He had done to the holy prophets,
who, foreseeing these things, said with exultation, "If a man shall
make gods, lo, they are no gods;" [322] and in another place, "And it
shall come to pass in that day, saith the Lord, that I will cut off
the names of the idols out of the land, and they shall no more be
remembered." [323]But the holy Isaiah prophesies expressly
concerning Egypt in reference to this matter, saying, "And the idols
of Egypt shall be moved at His presence, and their heart shall be
overcome in them," [324] and other things to the same effect. And
with the prophet are to be classed those who rejoiced that that which
they knew was to come had actually come,--as Simeon, or Anna, who
immediately recognized Jesus when He was born, or Elisabeth, who in
the Spirit recognized Him when He was conceived, or Peter, who said by
the revelation of the Father, "Thou art Christ, the Son of the living
God." [325]But to this Egyptian those spirits indicated the time of
their own destruction, who also, when the Lord was present in the
flesh, said with trembling, "Art Thou come hither to destroy us before
the time?" [326] meaning by destruction before the time, either that
very destruction which they expected to come, but which they did not
think would come so suddenly as it appeared to have done, or only that
destruction which consisted in their being brought into contempt by
being made known. And, indeed, this was a destruction before the
time, that is, before the time of judgment, when they are to be
punished with eternal damnation, together with all men who are
implicated in their wickedness, as the true religion declares, which
neither errs nor leads into error; for it is not like him who, blown
hither and thither by every wind of doctrine, and mixing true things
with things which are false, bewails as about to perish a religion,
which he afterwards confesses to be error.
Footnotes
[320] These quotations are from a dialogue between Hermes and
Æsculapius, which is said to have been translated into Latin by
Apuleius.
[321] Rom. i. 21.
[322] Jer. xvi. 10.
[323] Zech. xiii. 2.
[324] Isa. xix. 1.
[325] Matt. xvi. 16.
[326] Matt. viii. 29.
Chapter 24.--How Hermes Openly Confessed the Error of His Forefathers,
the Coming Destruction of Which He Nevertheless Bewailed.
After a long interval, Hermes again comes back to the subject of the
gods which men have made, saying as follows: "But enough on this
subject. Let us return to man and to reason, that divine gift on
account of which man has been called a rational animal. For the
things which have been said concerning man, wonderful though they are,
are less wonderful than those which have been said concerning reason.
For man to discover the divine nature, and to make it, surpasses the
wonder of all other wonderful things. Because, therefore, our
forefathers erred very far with respect to the knowledge of the gods,
through incredulity and through want of attention to their worship and
service, they invented this art of making gods; and this art once
invented, they associated with it a suitable virtue borrowed from
universal nature, and being incapable of making souls, they evoked
those of demons or of angels, and united them with these holy images
and divine mysteries, in order that through these souls the images
might have power to do good or harm to men." I know not whether the
demons themselves could have been made, even by adjuration, to confess
as he has confessed in these words: "Because our forefathers erred
very far with respect to the knowledge of the gods, through
incredulity and through want of attention to their worship and
service, they invented the art of making gods." Does he say that it
was a moderate degree of error which resulted in their discovery of
the art of making gods, or was he content to say "they erred?" No; he
must needs add "very far," and say, "They erred very far." It was
this great error and incredulity, then, of their forefathers who did
not attend to the worship and service of the gods, which was the
origin of the art of making gods. And yet this wise man grieves over
the ruin of this art at some future time, as if it were a divine
religion. Is he not verily compelled by divine influence, on the one
hand, to reveal the past error of his forefathers, and by a diabolical
influence, on the other hand, to bewail the future punishment of
demons? For if their forefathers, by erring very far with respect to
the knowledge of the gods, through incredulity and aversion of mind
from their worship and service, invented the art of making gods, what
wonder is it that all that is done by this detestable art, which is
opposed to the divine religion, should be taken away by that religion,
when truth corrects error, faith refutes incredulity, and conversion
rectifies aversion?
For if he had only said, without mentioning the cause, that his
forefathers had discovered the art of making gods, it would have been
our duty, if we paid any regard to what is right and pious, to
consider and to see that they could never have attained to this art if
they had not erred from the truth, if they had believed those things
which are worthy of God, if they had attended to divine worship and
service. However, if we alone should say that the causes of this art
were to be found in the great error and incredulity of men, and
aversion of the mind erring from and unfaithful to divine religion,
the impudence of those who resist the truth were in some way to be
borne with; but when he who admires in man, above all other things,
this power which it has been granted him to practise, and sorrows
because a time is coming when all those figments of gods invented by
men shall even be commanded by the laws to be taken away,--when even
this man confesses nevertheless, and explains the causes which led to
the discovery of this art, saying that their ancestors, through great
error and incredulity, and through not attending to the worship and
service of the gods, invented this art of making gods,--what ought we
to say, or rather to do, but to give to the Lord our God all the
thanks we are able, because He has taken away those things by causes
the contrary of those which led to their institution? For that which
the prevalence of error instituted, the way of truth took away; that
which incredulity instituted, faith took away; that which aversion
from divine worship and service instituted, conversion to the one true
and holy God took away. Nor was this the case only in Egypt, for
which country alone the spirit of the demons lamented in Hermes, but
in all the earth, which sings to the Lord a new song, [327] as the
truly holy and truly prophetic Scriptures have predicted, in which it
is written, "Sing unto the Lord a new song; sing unto the Lord, all
the earth." For the title of this psalm is, "When the house was built
after the captivity." For a house is being built to the Lord in all
the earth, even the city of God, which is the holy Church, after that
captivity in which demons held captive those men who, through faith in
God, became living stones in the house. For although man made gods, it
did not follow that he who made them was not held captive by them,
when, by worshipping them, he was drawn into fellowship with
them,--into the fellowship not of stolid idols, but of cunning demons;
for what are idols but what they are represented to be in the same
scriptures, "They have eyes, but they do not see," [328] and, though
artistically fashioned, are still without life and sensation? But
unclean spirits, associated through that wicked art with these same
idols, have miserably taken captive the souls of their worshippers, by
bringing them down into fellowship with themselves. Whence the
apostle says, "We know that an idol is nothing, but those things which
the Gentiles sacrifice they sacrifice to demons, and not to God; and I
would not ye should have fellowship with demons." [329]After this
captivity, therefore, in which men were held by malign demons, the
house of God is being built in all the earth; whence the title of that
psalm in which it is said, "Sing unto the Lord a new song; sing unto
the Lord, all the earth. Sing unto the Lord, bless His name; declare
well His salvation from day to day. Declare His glory among the
nations, among all people His wonderful things. For great is the
Lord, and much to be praised: He is terrible above all gods. For all
the gods of the nations are demons: but the Lord made the heavens."
[330]
Wherefore he who sorrowed because a time was coming when the worship
of idols should be abolished, and the domination of the demons over
those who worshipped them, wished, under the influence of a demon,
that that captivity should always continue, at the cessation of which
that psalm celebrates the building of the house of the Lord in all the
earth. Hermes foretold these things with grief, the prophet with
joyfulness; and because the Spirit is victorious who sang these things
through the ancient prophets, even Hermes himself was compelled in a
wonderful manner to confess, that those very things which he wished
not to be removed, and at the prospect of whose removal he was
sorrowful, had been instituted, not by prudent, faithful, and
religious, but by erring and unbelieving men, averse to the worship
and service of the gods. And although he calls them gods,
nevertheless, when he says that they were made by such men as we
certainly ought not to be, he shows, whether he will or not, that they
are not to be worshipped by those who do not resemble these
image-makers, that is, by prudent, faithful, and religious men, at the
same time also making it manifest that the very men who made them
involved themselves in the worship of those as gods who were not
gods. For true is the saying of the prophet, "If a man make gods, lo,
they are no gods." [331]Such gods, therefore, acknowledged by such
worshippers and made by such men, did Hermes call "gods made by men,"
that is to say, demons, through some art of I know not what
description, bound by the chains of their own lusts to images. But,
nevertheless, he did not agree with that opinion of the Platonic
Apuleius, of which we have already shown the incongruity and
absurdity, namely, that they were interpreters and intercessors
between the gods whom God made, and men whom the same God made,
bringing to God the prayers of men, and from God the gifts given in
answer to these prayers. For it is exceedingly stupid to believe that
gods whom men have made have more influence with gods whom God has
made than men themselves have, whom the very same God has made. And
consider, too, that it is a demon which, bound by a man to an image by
means of an impious art, has been made a god, but a god to such a man
only, not to every man. What kind of god, therefore, is that which no
man would make but one erring, incredulous, and averse to the true
God? Moreover, if the demons which are worshipped in the temples,
being introduced by some kind of strange art into images, that is,
into visible representations of themselves, by those men who by this
art made gods when they were straying away from, and were averse to
the worship and service of the gods,--if, I say, those demons are
neither mediators nor interpreters between men and the gods, both on
account of their own most wicked and base manners, and because men,
though erring, incredulous, and averse from the worship and service of
the gods, are nevertheless beyond doubt better than the demons whom
they themselves have evoked, then it remains to be affirmed that what
power they possess they possess as demons, doing harm by bestowing
pretended benefits,--harm all the greater for the deception,--or else
openly and undisguisedly doing evil to men. They cannot, however, do
anything of this kind unless where they are permitted by the deep and
secret providence of God, and then only so far as they are permitted.
When, however, they are permitted, it is not because they, being
midway between men and the gods, have through the friendship of the
gods great power over men; for these demons cannot possibly be friends
to the good gods who dwell in the holy and heavenly habitation, by
whom we mean holy angels and rational creatures, whether thrones, or
dominations, or principalities, or powers, from whom they are as far
separated in disposition and character as vice is distant from virtue,
wickedness from goodness.
Footnotes
[327] Ps. xcvi. 1.
[328] Ps. cxv. 5, etc.
[329] 1 Cor. x. 19, 20.
[330] Ps. xcvi. 1-5.
[331] Jer. xvi. 20.
Chapter 25.--Concerning Those Things Which May Be Common to the Holy
Angels and to Men.
Wherefore we must by no means seek, through the supposed mediation of
demons, to avail ourselves of the benevolence or beneficence of the
gods, or rather of the good angels, but through resembling them in the
possession of a good will, through which we are with them, and live
with them, and worship with them the same God, although we cannot see
them with the eyes of our flesh. But it is not in locality we are
distant from them, but in merit of life, caused by our miserable
unlikeness to them in will, and by the weakness of our character; for
the mere fact of our dwelling on earth under the conditions of life in
the flesh does not prevent our fellowship with them. It is only
prevented when we, in the impurity of our hearts, mind earthly
things. But in this present time, while we are being healed that we
may eventually be as they are, we are brought near to them by faith,
if by their assistance we believe that He who is their blessedness is
also ours.
Chapter 26.--That All the Religion of the Pagans Has Reference to Dead
Men.
It is certainly a remarkable thing how this Egyptian, when expressing
his grief that a time was coming when those things would be taken away
from Egypt, which he confesses to have been invented by men erring,
incredulous, and averse to the service of divine religion, says, among
other things, "Then shall that land, the most holy place of shrines
and temples, be full of sepulchres and dead men," as if, in sooth, if
these things were not taken away, men would not die! as if dead bodies
could be buried elsewhere than in the ground! as if, as time advanced,
the number of sepulchres must not necessarily increase in proportion
to the increase of the number of the dead! But they who are of a
perverse mind, and opposed to us, suppose that what he grieves for is
that the memorials of our martyrs were to succeed to their temples and
shrines, in order, forsooth, that they may have grounds for thinking
that gods were worshipped by the pagans in temples, but that dead men
are worshipped by us in sepulchres. For with such blindness do
impious men, as it were, stumble over mountains, and will not see the
things which strike their own eyes, that they do not attend to the
fact that in all the literature of the pagans there are not found any,
or scarcely any gods, who have not been men, to whom, when dead,
divine honors have been paid. I will not enlarge on the fact that
Varro says that all dead men are thought by them to be gods--Manes and
proves it by those sacred rites which are performed in honor of almost
all the dead, among which he mentions funeral games, considering this
the very highest proof of divinity, because games are only wont to be
celebrated in honor of divinities. Hermes himself, of whom we are now
treating, in that same book in which, as if foretelling future things,
he says with sorrow "Then shall that land, the most holy place of
shrines and temples, be full of sepulchres and dead men," testifies
that the gods of Egypt were dead men. For, having said that their
forefathers, erring very far with respect to the knowledge of the
gods, incredulous and inattentive to the divine worship and service,
invented the art of making gods, with which art, when invented, they
associated the appropriate virtue which is inherent in universal
nature, and by mixing up that virtue with this art, they called forth
the souls of demons or of angels (for they could not make souls), and
caused them to take possession of, or associate themselves with holy
images and divine mysteries, in order that through these souls the
images might have power to do good or harm to men;--having said this,
he goes on, as it were, to prove it by illustrations, saying, "Thy
grandsire, O Æsculapius, the first discoverer of medicine, to whom a
temple was consecrated in a mountain of Libya, near to the shore of
the crocodiles, in which temple lies his earthly man, that is, his
body,--for the better part of him, or rather the whole of him, if the
whole man is in the intelligent life, went back to heaven,--affords
even now by his divinity all those helps to infirm men which formerly
he was wont to afford to them by the art of medicine." He says,
therefore that a dead man was worshipped as a god in that place where
he had his sepulchre. He deceives men by a falsehood, for the man
"went back to heaven." Then he adds "Does not Hermes, who was my
grandsire, and whose name I bear, abiding in the country which is
called by his name, help and preserve all mortals who come to him from
every quarter?" For this elder Hermes, that is, Mercury, who, he
says, was his grandsire, is said to be buried in Hermopolis, that is,
in the city called by his name; so here are two gods whom he affirms
to have been men, Æsculapius and Mercury. Now concerning Æsculapius,
both the Greeks and the Latins think the same thing; but as to
Mercury, there are many who do not think that he was formerly a
mortal, though Hermes testifies that he was his grandsire. But are
these two different individuals who were called by the same name? I
will not dispute much whether they are different individuals or not.
It is sufficient to know that this Mercury of whom Hermes speaks is,
as well as Æsculapius, a god who once was a man, according, to the
testimony of this same Trismegistus, esteemed so great by his
countrymen, and also the grandson of Mercury himself.
Hermes goes on to say, "But do we know how many good things Isis, the
wife of Osiris, bestows when she is propitious, and what great
opposition she can offer when enraged?" Then, in order to show that
there were gods made by men through this art, he goes on to say, "For
it is easy for earthly and mundane gods to be angry, being made and
composed by men out of either nature;" thus giving us to understand
that he believed that demons were formerly the souls of dead men,
which, as he says, by means of a certain art invented by men very far
in error, incredulous, and irreligious, were caused to take possession
of images, because they who made such gods were not able to make
souls. When, therefore, he says "either nature," he means soul and
body,--the demon being the soul, and the image the body. What, then,
becomes of that mournful complaint, that the land of Egypt, the most
holy place of shrines and temples, was to be full of sepulchres and
dead men? Verily, the fallacious spirit, by whose inspiration Hermes
spoke these things, was compelled to confess through him that even
already that land was full of sepulchres and of dead men, whom they
were worshipping as gods. But it was the grief of the demons which
was expressing itself through his mouth, who were sorrowing on account
of the punishments which were about to fall upon them at the tombs of
the martyrs. For in many such places they are tortured and compelled
to confess, and are cast out of the bodies of men, of which they had
taken possession.
Chapter 27.--Concerning the Nature of the Honor Which the Christians
Pay to Their Martyrs.
But, nevertheless, we do not build temples, and ordain priests, rites,
and sacrifices for these same martyrs; for they are not our gods, but
their God is our God. Certainly we honor their reliquaries, as the
memorials of holy men of God who strove for the truth even to the
death of their bodies, that the true religion might be made known, and
false and fictitious religions exposed. For if there were some before
them who thought that these religions were really false and
fictitious, they were afraid to give expression to their convictions.
But who ever heard a priest of the faithful, standing at an altar
built for the honor and worship of God over the holy body of some
martyr, say in the prayers, I offer to thee a sacrifice, O Peter, or O
Paul, or O Cyprian? for it is to God that sacrifices are offered at
their tombs,--the God who made them both men and martyrs, and
associated them with holy angels in celestial honor; and the reason
why we pay such honors to their memory is, that by so doing we may
both give thanks to the true God for their victories, and, by
recalling them afresh to remembrance, may stir ourselves up to imitate
them by seeking to obtain like crowns and palms, calling to our help
that same God on whom they called. Therefore, whatever honors the
religious may pay in the places of the martyrs, they are but honors
rendered to their memory, [332] not sacred rites or sacrifices offered
to dead men as to gods. And even such as bring thither food,--which,
indeed, is not done by the better Christians, and in most places of
the world is not done at all,--do so in order that it may be
sanctified to them through the merits of the martyrs, in the name of
the Lord of the martyrs, first presenting the food and offering
prayer, and thereafter taking it away to be eaten, or to be in part
bestowed upon the needy. [333]But he who knows the one sacrifice of
Christians, which is the sacrifice offered in those places, also knows
that these are not sacrifices offered to the martyrs. It is, then,
neither with divine honors nor with human crimes, by which they
worship their gods, that we honor our martyrs; neither do we offer
sacrifices to them, or convert the crimes of the gods into their
sacred rites. For let those who will and can read the letter of
Alexander to his mother Olympias, in which he tells the things which
were revealed to him by the priest Leon, and let those who have read
it recall to memory what it contains, that they may see what great
abominations have been handed down to memory, not by poets, but by the
mystic writings of the Egyptians, concerning the goddess Isis, the
wife of Osiris, and the parents of both, all of whom, according to
these writings, were royal personages. Isis, when sacrificing to her
parents, is said to have discovered a crop of barley, of which she
brought some ears to the king her husband, and his councillor
Mercurius, and hence they identify her with Ceres. Those who read the
letter may there see what was the character of those people to whom
when dead sacred rites were instituted as to gods, and what those
deeds of theirs were which furnished the occasion for these rites.
Let them not once dare to compare in any respect those people, though
they hold them to be gods, to our holy martyrs, though we do not hold
them to be gods. For we do not ordain priests and offer sacrifices to
our martyrs, as they do to their dead men, for that would be
incongruous, undue, and unlawful, such being due only to God; and thus
we do not delight them with their own crimes, or with such shameful
plays as those in which the crimes of the gods are celebrated, which
are either real crimes committed by them at a time when they were men,
or else, if they never were men, fictitious crimes invented for the
pleasure of noxious demons. The god of Socrates, if he had a god,
cannot have belonged to this class of demons. But perhaps they who
wished to excel in this art of making gods, imposed a god of this sort
on a man who was a stranger to, and innocent of any connection with
that art. What need we say more? No one who is even moderately wise
imagines that demons are to be worshipped on account of the blessed
life which is to be after death. But perhaps they will say that all
the gods are good, but that of the demons some are bad and some good,
and that it is the good who are to be worshipped, in order that
through them we may attain to the eternally blessed life. To the
examination of this opinion we will devote the following book.
Footnotes
[332] Ornamenta memoriarum.
[333] Comp. The Confessions, vi. 2.
.
Book IX.
Argument--Having in the preceding book shown that the worship of
demons must be abjured, since they in a thousand ways proclaim
themselves to be wicked spirits, Augustin in this book meets those who
allege a distinction among demons, some being evil, while others are
good; and, having exploded this distinction, he proves that to no
demon, but to Christ alone, belongs the office of providing men with
eternal blessedness.
Chapter 1.--The Point at Which the Discussion Has Arrived, and What
Remains to Be Handled.
Some have advanced the opinion that there are both good and bad gods;
but some, thinking more respectfully of the gods, have attributed to
them so much honor and praise as to preclude the supposition of any
god being wicked. But those who have maintained that there are wicked
gods as well as good ones have included the demons under the name
"gods," and sometimes though more rarely, have called the gods demons;
so that they admit that Jupiter, whom they make the king and head of
all the rest, is called a demon by Homer. [334]Those, on the other
hand, who maintain that the gods are all good, and far more excellent
than the men who are justly called good, are moved by the actions of
the demons, which they can neither deny nor impute to the gods whose
goodness they affirm, to distinguish between gods and demons; so that,
whenever they find anything offensive in the deeds or sentiments by
which unseen spirits manifest their power, they believe this to
proceed not from the gods, but from the demons. At the same time they
believe that, as no god can hold direct intercourse with men, these
demons hold the position of mediators, ascending with prayers, and
returning with gifts. This is the opinion of the Platonists, the
ablest and most esteemed of their philosophers, with whom we therefore
chose to debate this question,--whether the worship of a number of
gods is of any service toward obtaining blessedness in the future
life. And this is the reason why, in the preceding book, we have
inquired how the demons, who take pleasure in such things as good and
wise men loathe and execrate, in the sacrilegious and immoral fictions
which the poets have written not of men, but of the gods themselves,
and in the wicked and criminal violence of magical arts, can be
regarded as more nearly related and more friendly to the gods than men
are, and can mediate between good men and the good gods; and it has
been demonstrated that this is absolutely impossible.
Footnotes
[334] See Plutarch, on the Cessation of Oracles.
Chapter 2.--Whether Among the Demons, Inferior to the Gods, There are
Any Good Spirits Under Whose Guardianship the Human Soul Might Reach
True Blessedness.
This book, then, ought, according to the promise made in the end of
the preceding one, to contain a discussion, not of the difference
which exists among the gods, who, according to the Platonists, are all
good, nor of the difference between gods and demons, the former of
whom they separate by a wide interval from men, while the latter are
placed intermediately between the gods and men, but of the difference,
since they make one, among the demons themselves. This we shall
discuss so far as it bears on our theme. It has been the common and
usual belief that some of the demons are bad, others good; and this
opinon, whether it be that of the Platonists or any other sect, must
by no means be passed over in silence, lest some one suppose he ought
to cultivate the good demons in order that by their mediation he may
be accepted by the gods, all of whom he believes to be good, and that
he may live with them after death; whereas he would thus be ensnared
in the toils of wicked spirits, and would wander far from the true
God, with whom alone, and in whom alone, the human soul, that is to
say, the soul that is rational and intellectual, is blessed.
Chapter 3.--What Apuleius Attributes to the Demons, to Whom, Though He
Does Not Deny Them Reason, He Does Not Ascribe Virtue.
What, then, is the difference between good and evil demons? For the
Platonist Apuleius, in a treatise on this whole subject, [335] while
he says a great deal about their aerial bodies, has not a word to say
of the spiritual virtues with which, if they were good, they must have
been endowed. Not a word has he said, then, of that which could give
them happiness; but proof of their misery he has given, acknowledging
that their mind, by which they rank as reasonable beings, is not only
not imbued and fortified with virtue so as to resist all unreasonable
passions, but that it is somehow agitated with tempestuous emotions,
and is thus on a level with the mind of foolish men. His own words
are: "It is this class of demons the poets refer to, when, without
serious error, they feign that the gods hate and love individuals
among men, prospering and ennobling some, and opposing and distressing
others. Therefore pity, indignation, grief, joy, every human emotion
is experienced by the demons, with the same mental disturbance, and
the same tide of feeling and thought. These turmoils and tempests
banish them far from the tranquility of the celestial gods." Can
there be any doubt that in these words it is not some inferior part of
their spiritual nature, but the very mind by which the demons hold
their rank as rational beings, which he says is tossed with passion
like a stormy sea? They cannot, then, be compared even to wise men,
who with undisturbed mind resist these perturbations to which they are
exposed in this life, and from which human infirmity is never exempt,
and who do not yield themselves to approve of or perpetrate anything
which might deflect them from the path of wisdom and law of
rectitude. They resemble in character, though not in bodily
appearance, wicked and foolish men. I might indeed say they are
worse, inasmuch as they have grown old in iniquity, and incorrigible
by punishment. Their mind, as Apuleius says, is a sea tossed with
tempest, having no rallying point of truth or virtue in their soul
from which they can resist their turbulent and depraved emotions.
Footnotes
[335] The De Deo Socratis.
Chapter 4.--The Opinion of the Peripatetics and Stoics About Mental
Emotions.
Among the philosophers there are two opinions about these mental
emotions, which the Greeks call pathe, while some of our own writers,
as Cicero, call them perturbations, [336] some affections, and some,
to render the Greek word more accurately, passions. Some say that
even the wise man is subject to these perturbations, though moderated
and controlled by reason, which imposes laws upon them, and so
restrains them within necessary bounds. This is the opinion of the
Platonists and Aristotelians; for Aristotle was Plato's disciple, and
the founder of the Peripatetic school. But others, as the Stoics, are
of opinion that the wise man is not subject to these perturbations.
But Cicero, in his book De Finibus, shows that the Stoics are here at
variance with the Platonists and Peripatetics rather in words than in
reality; for the Stoics decline to apply the term "goods" to external
and bodily advantages, [337] because they reckon that the only good is
virtue, the art of living well, and this exists only in the mind. The
other philosophers, again, use the simple and customary phraseology,
and do not scruple to call these things goods, though in comparison of
virtue, which guides our life, they are little and of small esteem.
And thus it is obvious that, whether these outward things are called
goods or advantages, they are held in the same estimation by both
parties, and that in this matter the Stoics are pleasing themselves
merely with a novel phraseology. It seems, then, to me that in this
question, whether the wise man is subject to mental passions, or
wholly free from them, the controversy is one of words rather than of
things; for I think that, if the reality and not the mere sound of the
words is considered, the Stoics hold precisely the same opinion as the
Platonists and Peripatetics. For, omitting for brevity's sake other
proofs which I might adduce in support of this opinion, I will state
but one which I consider conclusive. Aulus Gellius, a man of
extensive erudition, and gifted with an eloquent and graceful style,
relates, in his work entitled Noctes Atticæ [338] that he once made a
voyage with an eminent Stoic philosopher; and he goes on to relate
fully and with gusto what I shall barely state, that when the ship was
tossed and in danger from a violent storm, the philosopher grew pale
with terror. This was noticed by those on board, who, though
themselves threatened with death, were curious to see whether a
philosopher would be agitated like other men. When the tempest had
passed over, and as soon as their security gave them freedom to resume
their talk, one of the passengers, a rich and luxurious Asiatic,
begins to banter the philosopher, and rally him because he had even
become pale with fear, while he himself had been unmoved by the
impending destruction. But the philosopher availed himself of the
reply of Aristippus the Socratic, who, on finding himself similarly
bantered by a man of the same character, answered, "You had no cause
for anxiety for the soul of a profligate debauchee, but I had reason
to be alarmed for the soul of Aristippus." The rich man being thus
disposed of, Aulus Gellius asked the philosopher, in the interests of
science and not to annoy him, what was the reason of his fear? And he
willing to instruct a man so zealous in the pursuit of knowledge, at
once took from his wallet a book of Epictetus the Stoic, [339] in
which doctrines were advanced which precisely harmonized with those of
Zeno and Chrysippus, the founders of the Stoical school. Aulus
Gellius says that he read in this book that the Stoics maintain that
there are certain impressions made on the soul by external objects
which they call phantasiæ, and that it is not in the power of the soul
to determine whether or when it shall be invaded by these. When these
impressions are made by alarming and formidable objects, it must needs
be that they move the soul even of the wise man, so that for a little
he trembles with fear, or is depressed by sadness, these impressions
anticipating the work of reason and self-control; but this does not
imply that the mind accepts these evil impressions, or approves or
consents to them. For this consent is, they think, in a man's power;
there being this difference between the mind of the wise man and that
of the fool, that the fool's mind yields to these passions and
consents to them, while that of the wise man, though it cannot help
being invaded by them, yet retains with unshaken firmness a true and
steady persuasion of those things which it ought rationally to desire
or avoid. This account of what Aulus Gellius relates that he read in
the book of Epictetus about the sentiments and doctrines of the Stoics
I have given as well as I could, not, perhaps, with his choice
language, but with greater brevity, and, I think, with greater
clearness. And if this be true, then there is no difference, or next
to none, between the opinion of the Stoics and that of the other
philosophers regarding mental passions and perturbations, for both
parties agree in maintaining that the mind and reason of the wise man
are not subject to these. And perhaps what the Stoics mean by
asserting this, is that the wisdom which characterizes the wise man is
clouded by no error and sullied by no taint, but, with this
reservation that his wisdom remains undisturbed, he is exposed to the
impressions which the goods and ills of this life (or, as they prefer
to call them, the advantages or disadvantages) make upon them. For we
need not say that if that philosopher had thought nothing of those
things which he thought he was forthwith to lose, life and bodily
safety, he would not have been so terrified by his danger as to betray
his fear by the pallor of his cheek. Nevertheless, he might suffer
this mental disturbance, and yet maintain the fixed persuasion that
life and bodily safety, which the violence of the tempest threatened
to destroy, are not those good things which make their possessors
good, as the possession of righteousness does. But in so far as they
persist that we must call them not goods but advantages, they quarrel
about words and neglect things. For what difference does it make
whether goods or advantages be the better name, while the Stoic no
less than the Peripatetic is alarmed at the prospect of losing them,
and while, though they name them differently, they hold them in like
esteem? Both parties assure us that, if urged to the commission of
some immorality or crime by the threatened loss of these goods or
advantages, they would prefer to lose such things as preserve bodily
comfort and security rather than commit such things as violate
righteousness. And thus the mind in which this resolution is well
grounded suffers no perturbations to prevail with it in opposition to
reason, even though they assail the weaker parts of the soul; and not
only so, but it rules over them, and, while it refuses its consent and
resists them, administers a reign of virtue. Such a character is
ascribed to Æneas by Virgil when he says,
"He stands immovable by tears,
Nor tenderest words with pity hears." [340]
Footnotes
[336] De Fin. iii. 20; Tusc. Disp. iii. 4.
[337] The distinction between bona and commoda is thus given by Seneca
(Ep. 87, ad fin.): Commodum est quod plus usus est quam molestiæ;
bonum sincerum debet esse et ab omni parte innoxium.
[338] Book xix. ch. 1.
[339] See Diog. Laert. ii. 71.
[340] Virgil, Æn. iv. 449.
Chapter 5.--That the Passions Which Assail the Souls of Christians Do
Not Seduce Them to Vice, But Exercise Their Virtue.
We need not at present give a careful and copious exposition of the
doctrine of Scripture, the sum of Christian knowledge, regarding these
passions. It subjects the mind itself to God, that He may rule and
aid it, and the passions, again, to the mind, to moderate and bridle
them, and turn them to righteous uses. In our ethics, we do not so
much inquire whether a pious soul is angry, as why he is angry; not
whether he is sad, but what is the cause of his sadness; not whether
he fears, but what he fears. For I am not aware that any right
thinking person would find fault with anger at a wrongdoer which seeks
his amendment, or with sadness which intends relief to the suffering,
or with fear lest one in danger be destroyed. The Stoics, indeed, are
accustomed to condemn compassion. [341]But how much more honorable
had it been in that Stoic we have been telling of, had he been
disturbed by compassion prompting him to relieve a fellow-creature,
than to be disturbed by the fear of shipwreck! Far better and more
humane, and more consonant with pious sentiments, are the words of
Cicero in praise of Cæsar, when he says, "Among your virtues none is
more admirable and agreeable than your compassion." [342]And what
is compassion but a fellow-feeling for another's misery, which prompts
us to help him if we can? And this emotion is obedient to reason,
when compassion is shown without violating right, as when the poor are
relieved, or the penitent forgiven. Cicero, who knew how to use
language, did not hesitate to call this a virtue, which the Stoics are
not ashamed to reckon among the vices, although, as the book of the
eminent Stoic, Epictetus, quoting the opinions of Zeno and Chrysippus,
the founders of the school, has taught us, they admit that passions of
this kind invade the soul of the wise man, whom they would have to be
free from all vice. Whence it follows that these very passions are
not judged by them to be vices, since they assail the wise man without
forcing him to act against reason and virtue; and that, therefore, the
opinion of the Peripatetics or Platonists and of the Stoics is one and
the same. But, as Cicero says, [343] mere logomachy is the bane of
these pitiful Greeks, who thirst for contention rather than for
truth. However, it may justly be asked, whether our subjection to
these affections, even while we follow virtue, is a part of the
infirmity of this life? For the holy angels feel no anger while they
punish those whom the eternal law of God consigns to punishment, no
fellow-feeling with misery while they relieve the miserable, no fear
while they aid those who are in danger; and yet ordinary language
ascribes to them also these mental emotions, because, though they have
none of our weakness, their acts resemble the actions to which these
emotions move us; and thus even God Himself is said in Scripture to be
angry, and yet without any perturbation. For this word is used of the
effect of His vengeance, not of the disturbing mental affection.
Footnotes
[341] Seneca, De Clem. ii. 4 and 5.
[342] Pro. Lig. c. 12.
[343] De Oratore,i. 11, 47.
Chapter 6.--Of the Passions Which, According to Apuleius, Agitate the
Demons Who Are Supposed by Him to Mediate Between Gods and Men.
Deferring for the present the question about the holy angels, let us
examine the opinion of the Platonists, that the demons who mediate
between gods and men are agitated by passions. For if their mind,
though exposed to their incursion, still remained free and superior to
them, Apuleius could not have said that their hearts are tossed with
passions as the sea by stormy winds. [344]Their mind, then,--that
superior part of their soul whereby they are rational beings, and
which, if it actually exists in them, should rule and bridle the
turbulent passions of the inferior parts of the soul,--this mind of
theirs, I say, is, according to the Platonist referred to, tossed with
a hurricane of passions. The mind of the demons, therefore, is
subject to the emotions of fear, anger, lust, and all similar
affections. What part of them, then, is free, and endued with wisdom,
so that they are pleasing to the gods, and the fit guides of men into
purity of life,